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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1001 
 ___________ 
 
 FNU EVAH, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A097-703-347) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2012 
 
 Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 







 Fnu Evah petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision 
denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal and ordering her removed 





 Evah, a native and citizen of Indonesia, is a Christian of Chinese descent.  As 
developed in her affidavits and testimony, three separate incidents informed her eventual 
flight from her home country.  In May 1998, during an anti-Chinese riot in Jakarta, a mob 
invaded and looted her store.  One year later, during another disturbance, Evah and her 
boyfriend were beaten by assailants (described as “Indonesian Muslims”), and their store 
and house were burned down.  In the aftermath, Evah and her children sought refuge in a 
Buddhist temple; Evah later managed to find work in Taiwan.  At the end of her time in 
Taiwan, Evah returned to Indonesia.  The final incident, in July 2006, involved an 
episode of anti-Christian sentiment, accompanied by threats of future violence, directed 
at a Christian prayer group. 
 Evah traveled to the United States, where she was admitted as a nonimmigrant 
visitor for pleasure.  She eventually came to the attention of authorities by working for 
wages or other compensation without permission, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).  The Government commenced removal proceedings.  The first 
hearings in her case were held in 2007, at which time she conceded removability.  Evah 
eventually applied for asylum and withholding of removal based upon her mistreatment 
in Indonesia.1
                                                 
1 Evah also applied for protection under the Convention Against Torture, but would later 




 At the main merits hearing on July 13, 2010, Evah testified that she was afraid of 
being “killed and raped” by “native Indonesians” if she were to return to her home 
country.  Administrative Record (A.R.) 147.  During cross examination, counsel for the 
Government emphasized the lack of record documentation in support of Evah’s story, 
such as “any documentation to support [the] claim that [the] house and [the] store were 
burned to the ground.”  A.R. 147. 
 In an oral decision rendered after the close of testimony, the Immigration Judge 
(IJ) declined to grant asylum and withholding of removal.  While finding Evah to be 
generally credible, A.R. 41, the IJ expressed concern that “there [wa]s virtually no 
corroboration of any kind in this record of anything.”  A.R. 41.  He pointed out a 
“number of areas where the Court believes it would have been reasonable to present some 
degree of corroboration” in order to “paint at least a mosaic of what happened to the 
respondent in Indonesia, separate and apart from whether or not that rises to the level of 
past persecution.” A.R. 41.  The IJ cited, as possible examples of corroborating evidence, 
letters from family members, some documentation regarding ownership of the house or 
store, letters from attendees at the interrupted 2006 prayer service, and so on.  A.R. 42–
43.  In sum, the IJ found that Evah had “not suffered with sufficient severity to establish 
past persecution.”  A.R. 43.  Also, after “careful consideration of and analysis of all the 
exhibits in the record, both individually and cumulatively,” he separately concluded that 




 Evah appealed the decision to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in his past-
persecution finding and by “ignor[ing] the weight of the evidence on the record which 
confirmed a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese Christians.”  A.R. 19 
(adjusted to sentence case).  The BIA dismissed the appeal, primarily on the basis of 
corroboration; as Evah had “failed to sufficiently support her claim with corroboration as 
requested by the Immigration Judge, [the BIA] agree[d] with the Immigration Judge that 
[she] failed to meet her burden of proof.”  A.R. 4.  It also upheld the IJ’s pattern-or-
practice finding.  A.R. 4.  This counseled petition for review followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), reviewing primarily the 
decision of the BIA, but looking to the decision of the IJ to the extent that the BIA 
adopted or deferred to it.  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Our review is conducted under the substantial-evidence standard, which requires us to 
uphold administrative findings of fact unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Because Evah’s asylum application was filed 
after May 11, 2005, the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005 apply in this case.  See 
Dong v. Att’y Gen
 In an application for asylum or its derivative relief, the burden of proof is on the 
alien to show that she is a refugee, defined as, inter alia, a person who is unwilling or 
unable to return to her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
, 638 F.3d 223, 229 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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persecution” based on an enumerated ground.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 
1158(b)(1)(B).  There are two independent pathways by which she may proceed.  First, 
upon a successful showing of past persecution, she would be entitled to a rebuttable 
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 
527 F.3d 330, 341 (3d Cir. 2008).  Alternatively, “it is not necessary for a petitioner to 
show past persecution if she can nonetheless show a well-founded fear of future 
persecution without the benefit of such a presumption.”  Id.
III. 
 at 345.  In order to establish 
eligibility for withholding of removal, an alien must demonstrate that it is more likely 
than not that her life or freedom would be threatened in Indonesia on account of a 
protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
 a) 
 Evah argues that the BIA and IJ erred by requiring corroboration of her story.  She 
maintains, in addition, that the IJ and BIA failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements for requesting and presenting corroborating evidence. 
Past Persecution 
 “[C]orroboration and credibility, although intuitively related, are distinct concepts 
that should be analyzed independently.”  Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Hence, the IJ’s conclusion that Evah testified credibly is not the end of the 
inquiry.  While “[t]he testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the 
applicant’s burden without corroboration,” the trier of fact may determine “that the 
applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony.”  8 
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U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(b)(ii).  If the agency decides that corroboration is appropriate, “such 
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot 
reasonably obtain the evidence.”  Id.; see also Dong, 638 F.3d at 229 n.3.  The 
corroboration process contemplates a three-part inquiry:  “(1) an identification of the 
facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an inquiry as to whether the 
applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and, if he or she has 
not, (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained his or her failure to 
do so.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “It is reasonable to expect corroboration where the facts are central to the 
applicant’s claim and easily subject to verification.”  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen.
 In his opinion, the IJ lamented the general lack of corroboration in the record.  We 
agree with Evah that some of his observations, such as Evah’s failure to corroborate her 
church attendance in Indonesia, A.R. 37, arguably pertained to aspects of her claim that 
were not “central” to her story.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the agency properly held 
that Evah failed to meet her burden of proof due to the paucity of corroborating 
information in the record.  Both the IJ and BIA followed the three-part 
, 484 F.3d 
185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) 
Abdulai test, 
identifying areas where it would be reasonable to expect corroboration and examples of 
such corroboration—for example, any evidence or third-person account of the 1999 
destruction of her home, an incident that was undoubtedly central to her application for 
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relief.  See A.R. 3, 38, 42.2  They noted that Evah had not presented such evidence and 
had offered no real explanation for her failure to do so.  Moreover, several years passed 
between her initial apprehension by authorities and her eventual merits hearing, and 
while we recognize that not all of the material identified by the agency may have been 
obtainable, the bare minimum of what was requested by the IJ, such as letters from 
family members, was well within reach.  See, e.g., A.R. 146 (showing that the petitioner 
was in contact with her children as of 2010).  This is not a case in which the agency 
demanded corroboration above and beyond what the petitioner had already provided, but 
rather a case where no corroboration of any essential elements was put forward.  Hence, 
we cannot find error in the agency’s decision.  See also
 Evah also argues that the IJ failed to provide her with an opportunity to present the 
corroborating documents that he had requested.  
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) 
(establishing stringent standard for reversal based on availability of corroborating 
evidence). 
See Pet’r’s Br. 25; see also Chukwu, 484 
F.3d at 192.  This claim was not raised below, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to 
consider it.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Castro v. Att’y Gen.
                                                 
2 Through counsel, Evah argues that her children “could not corroborate that [her] home 
was burned to the ground where she testified they were not present when the home was 
burned.”  Pet’r’s Br. 24.  However, the page she cites appears to suggest to the contrary.  
See A.R. 320 (“In May of 1999, my family and I were in the house . . . .”).  Nothing in 
Evah’s testimony supports her current argument that the children were not present when 
the house was burned. 






 Evah maintains that her submissions to the agency, as well as her testimony, 
“established a pattern and practice of persecution of Christians in Indonesia,” and accuses 
the IJ of failing “to meaningfully consider the evidence submitted in this particular 
record, including the expert affidavits relating to the persecution of ethnic Chinese 
Christians throughout Indonesia.”  Pet’r’s Br. 33.  However, we agree with the BIA that 
the IJ’s decision reflects a careful review of the evidence.  
Future Persecution 
See A.R. 4; see also A.R. 29 
(revealing that the IJ considered “the contents of Dr. Winter’s affidavit . . . along with the 
affidavit from Jana Mason”).  The IJ acknowledged ongoing problems that “Christians 
continue to face in various areas of Indonesia,” but held that the turmoil did not rise to a 
level constituting a pattern or practice of persecution—that is, a level reflecting 
“systemic, pervasive, or organized” persecution.  Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 233 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).4
                                                 
3 The BIA’s decision to address generally the matter of corroboration, which was 
sufficient to grant us jurisdiction over that broader question, see Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 593 (3d Cir. 2011), did not serve to exhaust the specific matter 
of whether all procedural requirements were complied with.  This is of particular import 
in situations where the agency could have easily corrected its error by remanding for 
further fact-finding or reopening proceedings.  As the record demonstrates no attempt by 
Evah to “place the [BIA] on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on appeal,” Lin 
v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations, citations omitted), and as the 
BIA did not consider the matter on its own, we may not reach the issue. 
  While a reasonable observer could plausibly draw a 
4 We note that Evah has explicitly stated that she is not pursuing relief based on her 
potential for being singled out for harm if returned to Indonesia.  See Pet’r’s Br. 20; see 
also Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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different conclusion from the record evidence, “[w]here the record supports plausible but 
conflicting inferences in an immigration case, the . . . choice between those inferences is, 
a fortiori, supported by substantial evidence.”  De Hincapie v. Gonzales
 c) 
, 494 F.3d 213, 
219 (1st Cir. 2007).  In sum, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding on future 
persecution. 
 Because Evah failed to qualify for asylum, she is necessarily ineligible for 
withholding of removal.  
Withholding of Removal 
Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y Gen.
IV. 
, 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 In sum, and for the foregoing reasons, we will deny Evah’s petition for review. 
